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Abstract:  This paper proposes a theoretical growth model where 
seigniorage can be used to finance productive public spending, and show 
the existence of nonlinear effects between seigniorage and economic 
growth. Empirical evidence based on panel regression techniques provides 
some support for these nonlinear effects on a sample of OECD countries 
over the 1978-2005 period. 
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Non-technical summary 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical model allowing for the seigniorage 
financing of productive public spending. In line with numerous recent empirical 
stylized facts (Kim & Willett, 2000, Black et al., 2001, Bolton & Alexander, 2001), 
we emphasize the presence of nonlinearities between seigniorage and economic 
growth. Empirical evidence based on panel regression techniques on a sample of 22 
OECD countries using annual data over the 1978-2005 period support the predictions 
of our theoretical model. We also test for a structural equation to investigate the 
existence of a joint inverted-U relation between both seigniorage and taxes, and 
growth, which is empirically confirmed by data. 
   2
1. Introduction 
 
Early theoretical growth models conclude that inflation is harmful or at best neutral 
to economic growth, as Palivos & Yip (1995). Empirical work in Alexander (1997) 
emphasizes similar conclusions, but Paul et al. (1997) and Arai et al. (2004) question 
the robustness of this result. Further contributions isolate a negative correlation 
between inflation and economic growth, but only for high inflation (Black et al., 
2001, or Bolton & Alexander, 2001), suggesting that the relation between inflation 
and growth is probably nonlinear (Kim & Willett, 2000). 
 
The aim of this paper is to emphasize the presence of nonlinearities between 
monetary policy and economic growth. For this matter, we develop in the next 
section a theoretical model allowing for nonlinear effects of seigniorage on growth. 
The empirical validity of these nonlinear effects is demonstrated in section 3 for a 
sample of OECD countries using panel regression techniques over the 1978-2005 
period. Concluding remarks are reported in section 4. 
 
2. The model 
 
We consider a closed economy with a representative agent, a government and 
monetary authorities. The agent maximizes intertemporal utility, with a log-utility 
based on consumption ( 0 t c > ) and  0 > β  the subjective discount rate
1: 
() ( ) dt t c Log W t ∫
∞
− =
0
exp β ,        (1) 
                                                 
1 Results are not modified for a more general isoelastic function ( ) ( ) () σ
σ − − =
− 1 / 1
1 c c v t , with 
0 > σ  the inverse of the constant elasticity of substitution (see Minea & Villieu, 2007).   3
Output  t y  is produced with private capital  t k  and the flow of productive public 
spending  t g , with  1 0 < < ε  the elasticity of output to private capital and we assume 
no congestion, as in Barro (1990) (all variables are expressed per capita): 
 
 
ε ε − =
1
t t t g k y          ( 2 )  
 
Household budget constraint is, in real variables ( x dt dx x ∀ ≡ , / & ): 
 
  () t t t t t t t m k c y m k π δ τ − − − − = + 1 & &       (3) 
 
Households use their income ( ) t y  to consume ( ) t c , invest ( ) tt t zk k δ =+ & , with δ  
the private capital depreciation rate, and pay flat-rate taxes on output () t y τ , as in 
Barro (1990). We depart from Barro (1990) by assuming that agents hold money. 
The real balance stock is  / tt t mM P = , with  t M  the nominal money stock and  t P  the 
price level.  / tt t P P π = &  is the inflation rate, hence real money stock depreciation per 
unit of time is  tt m π . To motivate a money demand, we introduce a cash-in-advance 
(CIA) constraint on all spending
2: 
 
t t t t m g z c = + +         ( 4 )  
 
Monetary authorities supply the nominal money stock  t M . Equilibrium on the 
money market determines the price level  t t t m M P / = . We are interested in monetary 
                                                 
2 With a CIA on consumption only, raising money is always growth enhancing (Turnovsky, 1996).   4
policies that set an exogenous growth rate for money supply  θ = t t M M / & . Monetary 
authorities collect real seigniorage  t t t m P M θ θ = /  and transfer it to government: 
 
  t t t m y g θ τ + =          ( 5 )  
 
Relation (5) departs from the Barro (1990) budget constraint ( ) tt g y τ = , since 
seigniorage can be used for government finance, as in Palivos & Yip (1995). 
However, Palivos & Yip (1995) consider exogenous unproductive public spending, 
while they are endogenous in our framework. 
 
Maximizing (1) subject to (2)-(3)-(4),  0 k  given and a standard transversality 
condition, yields the traditional Keynes-Ramsey relation (we further omit for the 
sake of simplicity time indexes)  β γ − = ≡ r c c/ & , with r  the real interest rate. If 
investment is money-constrained, as in (4), the real interest rate becomes 
()( ) δ − + = i k y r 1 / ' , with i the nominal interest rate (Stockman, 1981). The return 
on private investment  ( ) k y'  must be deflated by the monetary financing cost of new 
capitals  () i + 1 ; hence  r  stands for (net of monetary financing costs) private capital 
productivity. Under the technology (2) and flat-rate taxes, the real interest rate is 
() () () δ τ ε
ε − + − =
− i k g r 1 / / 1
1 . Using the government constraint (5), money market 
equilibrium  π θ − = m m/ &  and the Fisher equation  π + = r i , we find steady-state 
economic growth rate γ  as:  
 
() ( )
( )
β δ
β θ
θ τ τ ε
γ
ε ε
− −
+ +
+ −
=
−
1
1
/ 1
      (6)   5
We can then demonstrate the following result: 
Proposition 1: 
(a)   An inverted-U curve exists between money and economic growth; 
(b)  The optimal money growth rate is an increasing function of the tax rate. 
(c)   An inverted-U curve exists between taxes and growth. 
 
Proof:  
(a) and (b): using the first order condition  ( ) 0 / , = ∂ ∂ θ θ τ γ  we get the growth-
maximizing money growth rate  ( )( )
1 2
1 1 *
−
− + −
=
ε
ετ β ε
θ , which is inversely related to 
taxes. 
 
(c): Using the first order condition  ( ) 0 / , = ∂ ∂ τ θ τ γ , the growth maximizing flat-rate 
tax is  εθ ε τ − − =1
* , with a similar explanation as in Barro (1990). 
 
To enlighten Proposition 1a,b, remark that any increase in seigniorage is devoted to 
productive public expenditures that are growth-enhancing (numerator of (6)), but 
such an increase simultaneously raises the financing cost of private investment, 
which is harmful to growth (denominator of (6)). The trade-off between these two 
effects illustrates that productive public spending crowd-out private investment, 
results in the ceiling 
* θ . As tax rate increases, the elasticity of public spending to 
seigniorage decreases, which explains why 
* θ  is inversely related to τ . Our findings 
reproduce numerous empirical results emphasizing the existence of threshold 
(nonlinear) effects between seigniorage or inflation
3 and growth. For instance, 
                                                 
3 Generally, long-run inflation ( γ θ π − = ) positively depends on seigniorage.   6
Thirlwall & Barton (1971) identify the positive effects of inflation rates inferior-to-
8%, on growth and negative effects for inflation higher-than-10%. Gylfasson (1991) 
associates high-growth countries with lower-to-5% inflation rates, and low-growth 
economies to inflation higher than-20%, while Sarrel (1996) and Bolton & 
Alexander (2001) find a breakpoint in inflation to growth relation. 
 
3. Empirical link between monetary policy and economic growth 
 
3.1 The effects of seigniorage on economic growth 
 
To investigate the empirical validity of our theoretical results, we perform panel 
regressions on a sample of 22 OECD countries
4 using annual data covering the 
period 1978-2005. Selected variables are real GDP growth (γ ) and the tax rate (τ , 
computed as the fiscal and non-fiscal total revenues of public administration to GDP 
ratio) from OECD Economic Perspectives, with money growth θ  from the IMF 
database IFS. Table 1 exhibits results related to the estimation of a model including 
fixed effects in accordance with data properties. 
 
Table 1 – The nonlinear relation between seigniorage and economic growth 
 
  Dependent variable: real GDP growth rate 
  [i] [ii]  [iii] 
average dummy   0.026  0.026  0.025 
θ   0.022 (0.012)
*  0.024  (0.012)
** 
2 θ   -0.031 (0.009)
*** -0.029  (0.010)
***  
τ θ *    0.035  (0.029)  
τ θ *
2      -0.062  (0.015)
*** 
                                                 
4 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and the United States. Burdekin et al. (2004) suggest not to mix developed with developing 
countries when assessing inflation effects on output.   7
Observations () NT   581 561 561 
Countries   22  22  22 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.2008 0.2032 0.2116 
F  Fisher  3.827 [0.00]  3.801 [0.00]  4.058 [0.00] 
 
Notes:  
a - standard errors are into parenthesis, p-values into brackets; we introduce country fixed 
effects using dummies; all dummies are significant; average dummy stands for the average 
country fixed effect.  
b- 
***1% significance; 
**5% significance; 
*10% significance. 
 
Significant coefficients in regression [i] confirm the presence of nonlinearities 
between growth and seigniorage, describing an inverted-U shape (negative square-
money growth coefficient) with positive economic growth-maximizing money 
growth (positive money growth coefficient).  
 
While these results sustain our theoretical findings in Proposition 1a, we further give 
interest to Proposition 1b. For this matter, we specify a quadratic model in θ  and 
allow the optimal money growth rate to linearly depend on the tax rate. In 
regressions [ii]  it it it it i it u + + + =
2
2 1 θ α τ θ α µ γ  and [iii]  it it it it i it u + + + = τ θ α θ α µ γ
2
2 1 , 
seigniorage and square-seigniorage respectively are multiplied by the tax rate. 
 
Both models [ii] and [iii] exhibit inverted-U curves with positive optimal seigniorage 
values (see Table 1). Nevertheless, they imply opposite correlations between the 
optimal seigniorage value 
* θ  and the tax rateτ . In model [ii], the maximum 
( ) 2 1
* ˆ 2 / ˆ ˆ α τ α θ − =  implies a positive correlation, while in model [iii] the maximum 
( ) τ α α θ 2 1
* ˆ 2 / ˆ ˆ − =  implies a negative correlation. However, as in model [iii] all 
estimated coefficients are significant, which is not the case for model [ii], we focus 
on what follows in model [iii]. As emphasized above, in this model the growth-  8
maximizing estimated seigniorage rate is inversely related to taxes  τ θ / 194 . 0 ˆ* = , 
confirming the robustness of Proposition 1b. 
 
3.2 Nonlinear joint effects between seigniorage, taxes and economic growth 
 
In accordance with Proposition 1, both taxes and seigniorage exhibit nonlinear 
effects on economic growth. Next, we investigate the presence of a joint nonlinear 
relation between seigniorage, taxes and growth, in which both optimal money 
* θ  and 
taxes 
* τ  would depend on τ  and θ  respectively. Consequently, our regressions must 
enclose square-money growth and square taxes (for possible inverted-U curves), but 
also a multiple of  θ τ * . Table 2 summarizes results. 
 
Table 2 – The joint nonlinear relation between taxes, seigniorage and growth 
 
  Dependent variable: real GDP growth rate 
  [A] [B] [C] [D]  [E] 
average dummy  0.013  0.026  0.042  0.025  0.039 
θ   0.020 (0.012)
*       0.054  (0.029)
* 
2 *θ τ    -0.054  (0.022)
**   -0.015  (0.025)  -0.029  (0.029) 
θ τ *      0.034  (0.029)  0.348  (0.114)
***  
2 θ   -0.029 (0.009)
***  -0.029  (0.010)
***    
τ   0.132 (0.182)        -0.031 (0.034) 
θ τ *
2    -0.050  (0.067)   -0.719  (0.261)
*** -0.213  (0.063) 
2 τ   -0.231 (0.216)    -0.084 (0.033)
***    
Obs. () NT   561 561 561 561  561 
Countries  22 22 22 22  22 
Adj. 
2 R   0.2134 0.2053 0.2123 0.2189  0.2174 
F  Fisher  4.87 [0.00]  3.87 [0.00]  3.95 [0.00]  4.15 [0.00]  3.98 [0.00] 
 
Notes:  
a - standard errors are into parenthesis, p-values into brackets; we introduce country fixed 
effects using dummies; all dummies are significant; average dummy stands for the average 
country fixed effect.  
b- 
***1% significance; 
**5% significance; 
*10% significance. 
 
Note first the presence of non-significant coefficients in all [A]-[E] regressions. 
Depending on the selected model, an inverted-U relation exists on either taxes or   9
seigniorage, but never a joint significant one. These results may receive at least two 
interpretations. First, despite five different specifications, we may have been unable 
to avoid colinearity problems between variables. One solution would be to search for 
econometrical specifications that avoid these colinearities. Secondly, it may 
emphasize that models [B]-[E] are unable to vigorously approximate our theoretical 
relation. Precisely, quadratic form may well reproduce individual inverted-U curves, 
while less adapted to approximate joint inverted-U curves. 
 
To deal with this issue, we directly consider equation (6). For this purpose, assuming 
δ  and β  sufficiently small, one can log-linearize (6) and get: 
 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) τ τ τ ε ε τ ε γ + + + − + − + = 1 log log * / 1 1 log log log  (7) 
, with  () ε α log 0 ≡  and ( ) ε ε / 1−  included in  2 α . 
 
We then estimate the following equation on the same panel data set of OECD 
countries: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) it it it it it i it u + + + + + − + = θ α θ τ α τ α α γ 1 log log 1 log log 3 2 1 0  (8) 
 
Table 3 –  ( ) θ τ γ ,  
  ( ) γ Log  
average dummy  -0.396 
( ) τ − 1 Log   3.299 (0.327)
*** 
( ) θ τ + Log   1.801 (0.315)
*** 
( ) θ + 1 Log   -2.985 (0.693)
*** 
Obs. ( ) NT   502 
Countries ( ) N   22 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.1982 
F  Fisher  3.273 [0.00]  
   10
Notes:  
a - standard errors are into parenthesis, p-values into brackets; we introduce country fixed 
effects using dummies; all dummies are significant; average dummy stands for the average 
country fixed effect.  
b- 
***1% significance. 
 
All coefficients are now significant with a sign in accordance with theoretical 
expectations  (positive for  τ − 1  and  θ τ +  and negative for  θ + 1 ). These 
econometric results provide evidence in favor of the theoretical model developed in 
section 2, and emphasize the empirical relevance of a joint inverted-U relation 
between taxes, seigniorage and growth. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
We developed in this paper a theoretical model allowing for the seigniorage 
financing of productive public spending. In line with numerous recent empirical 
stylized facts (Kim & Willett, 2000, Black et al., 2001, Bolton & Alexander, 2001), 
we emphasized the presence of nonlinearities between seigniorage and economic 
growth. Empirical evidence based on panel regression techniques on a sample of 22 
OECD countries using annual data over the 1978-2005 period support the predictions 
of our theoretical model. We also tested for a structural equation to investigate the 
existence of a joint inverted-U relation between both seigniorage and taxes, and 
growth, which was empirically confirmed by data. 
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